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NOTE
More Than Just a Potted Plant: A Court’s
Authority to Review Deferred Prosecution
Agreements Under the Speedy Trial Act and Under
Its Inherent Supervisory Power
Mary Miller*
In the last decade, the Department of Justice has increasingly relied on pretrial 
diversion agreements as a means of resolving corporate criminal cases short of 
prosecution. These pretrial diversion agreements—non-prosecution and de-
ferred prosecution agreements—include substantive terms that a company 
must abide by for the duration of the agreement in order to avoid prosecution. 
When entering a deferred prosecution agreement, the Department of Justice 
files charges against the defendant corporation as well as an agreement outlin-
ing the variety of terms with which the company must comply. This delay in 
prosecution is permitted under the Speedy Trial Act, which provides an excep-
tion to the general requirement that prosecution commence seventy days after 
charges are filed for delays intended to allow a defendant to demonstrate 
“good conduct.” Until very recently, these agreements were accepted and ap-
proved by courts without question. In 2013, however, over the objection of the 
Department of Justice, a district court scrutinized a deferral and, in 2015, a 
second district court rejected a deferral because the terms of the agreement 
were, in its view, much too lenient. The 2015 rejection has raised questions 
about the proper roles of courts and prosecutors in resolving criminal cases. In 
particular, judicial review of deferred prosecution agreements might improp-
erly interfere with the Executive’s discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a 
criminal defendant, thereby violating separation-of-power principles. This 
Note argues, however, that judicial review is appropriate and constitutionally 
permissible. First, review authority is appropriate because Congress has 
granted the courts that review authority under a proper reading of the Speedy 
Trial Act. Additionally, the congressional grant of review authority is bolstered 
by the inherent supervisory power of courts to ensure the fair administration 
of criminal justice.
* J.D., May 2016, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank University
of Michigan Law School Professors Rebecca Eisenberg, Nina Mendelson, and David Uhlmann,
the University of Michigan Law School Student Scholarship Workshop, and Matthew
Sappington for constructive feedback throughout this project. I would also like to thank Erin
Chapman, Andrea Scanlan, Sachi Schuricht, Julie Siegel, Danielle Kalil-McLane, Matt Wallace
and the Michigan Law Review Notes Office for insightful comments and excellent editing. I
will be clerking for Judge Richard J. Leon of the District Court for the District of Columbia for
the 2019–2020 term. All views are my own and all errors are my own.
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Introduction
In resolving allegations of corporate wrongdoing, the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) has a variety of tools at its disposal. These tools include
indictment, negotiated plea agreements, non-prosecution agreements
(“NPAs”), deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”), reliance on separate
civil resolution, and declining to prosecute altogether.1 In the past decade,
federal prosecutors have increasingly relied on NPAs and DPAs,2 employing
them as a way of exacting punishment in the form of monetary penalties or
the institution of mandatory compliance measures for corporate wrongdo-
ing, while avoiding the collateral consequences of conviction for innocent
third parties such as shareholders and employees.3 In a deferred prosecution,
1. Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corpo-
rate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District
of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1043, 1043 (2006).
2. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Trends in the Use of Non-Prosecution, Deferred
Prosecution, and Plea Agreements in the Settlement of Alleged Corporate Criminal Wrongdoing,
L. & Econ. Ctr. Geo. Mason U. Sch. L. ix (April 2015), http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/
files/Full%20Report%20-%20SCJI%20NPA-DPA,%20April%202015(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/
V5WD-6QBW] (providing empirical evidence that NPA and DPA use has grown substantially
since 2003).
3. F. Joseph Warin et al., 2013 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agree-
ments and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (Part 1), Westlaw J. White-Collar Crime, April
2014, at 1 [hereinafter 2013 Year-End Update]; see also Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen.
Mark Filip to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of
Bus. Orgs. § 9-28.720(a) (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Memorandum from Mark Filip], availa-
ble at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5TZ-TM5L] (explaining how individuals and corporations can con-
duct internal investigations to potentially avoid indictment).
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the prosecutor files charges with the relevant court, where they remain on
the court’s docket until the end of the contemplated term of the agreement,
at which point the Government dismisses the charges.4 In a non-prosecu-
tion, the Government and the corporation agree that the Government will
not file charges against the corporation if the corporation complies with the
specified terms of the agreement.5
The use of NPAs and DPAs has exploded in recent years.6 From 2000 to
2004, the DOJ entered into an average of approximately four NPA or DPA
agreements per year.7 Since 2006, it averaged twenty agreements per year.8 In
the first half of 2015, the DOJ entered into twenty-eight agreements, exceed-
ing the total number of DOJ agreements reached in 2013.9 The significant
increase of agreements has also led to a significant increase in monetary
penalties collected by the DOJ from corporate defendants because such
agreements often also require that the corporation pay a specific fine to the
DOJ. In 2001, the DOJ recovered $0.9 billion in NPA and DPA fines; in the
first half of 2015, it recovered $4.2 billion.10
Federal prosecutors have relied upon the Speedy Trial Act and its “good
conduct” exclusion when entering into DPAs with corporate defendants.
The Speedy Trial Act requires that after a defendant has been charged with
committing an offense, trial “commence within seventy days from the filing
date . . . of the . . . indictment.”11 The Act allows for court-approved delays
in computing the time within which the trial must commence, including any
period of delay during which the Government defers prosecution, “for the
4. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1789, 1800
(2015); see also Remarks of Assistant Att’y Gen. Leslie R. Caldwell at the New York University
Center on the Administration of Criminal Law’s Seventh Annual Conference on Regulatory
Offenses and Criminal Law (Apr. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Remarks of Leslie R. Caldwell], http://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-new-
york-university-center [https://perma.cc/B32H-72XP].
5. Garrett, supra note 4, at 1800.
6. From 2001 to 2014, prosecutors reached 306 DPAs and NPAs with corporations.
Garrett, supra note 4, at 1802 (citing Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational
Prosecution Agreements, U. Va. Sch. of L., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecu-
tion_agreements/home.suphp [https://perma.cc/SNK7-MZHT]). I have offered statistics for
both NPAs and DPAs, despite the fact that this Note is concerned primarily with DPAs, be-
cause the literature combines both types of pretrial diversion agreements together when re-
porting statistics.
7. 2013 Year-End Update, supra note 3, at 1.
8. 2015 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 1–2 (July 8, 2015) [hereinaf-
ter 2015 Mid-Year Update], http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2015-Mid-Year-
Update-Corporate-Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx
[https://perma.cc/X5JB-R59M]. The DOJ entered thirty-nine agreements in 2007 and another
thirty-nine in 2010. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 1–2. The DOJ reached five DPAs and twenty-three NPAs in the first half of
2015. Id. at 1. The SEC entered into one DPA in the first half of 2015. Id.
10. Id. at 2. In 2012, the DOJ recovered $9.0 billion; in 2013, $2.9 billion; and in 2014,
$5.1 billion. Id.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2012).
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purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”12 The
exclusion was originally intended to provide a more lenient alternative to
prosecution for nonviolent, low-level offenses.13 With DPAs, the Govern-
ment sets a period of delay during which a corporate defendant must
demonstrate good conduct by complying with the terms of the DPA.14 These
terms often include the payment of fines, monitoring, and the creating or
improving of existing compliance programs.15 At the end of this time period,
the Government dismisses the charges, so long as the defendant has com-
plied with the terms.16
Until recently there was no case law interpreting the “good conduct”
provision and little judicial scrutiny of the resulting agreements, despite the
Government’s widespread reliance on this exclusion.17 In July 2013, however,
a district court concluded it had the power to exercise its supervisory au-
thority in accepting or rejecting a DPA.18 It eventually approved the DPA at
issue but challenged the notion that courts were no more than “potted
plant[s]” in DPA implementation.19 For the first time, a court offered an
12. Id. § 3161(h)(2). Other periods of delay allowed under the Act include “[a]ny period
of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant,” id. § 3161(h)(1), “[a]ny
period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential
witness,” id. § 3161(h)(3)(A), and “[a]ny period of delay resulting from the fact that the de-
fendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial,” id. § 3161(h)(4).
13. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 1842 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93–1508, at 1 (1974); then
citing S. Rep. No. 93–1021, at 36–37 (1974)).
14. Ellis W. Martin, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: “Too Big to Jail” and the Potential of
Judicial Oversight Combined with Congressional Legislation, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 457, 463
(2014).
15. Id. at 463–64.
16. Id. at 461 n.33.
17. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853, 922
(2007).
18. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013); see also Steven E. Fagell et al., The HSBC DPA—Approved, but at What
Cost?, Law360 (July 8, 2013, 3:09 PM) [hereinafter The HSBC DPA], http://www.law360.com/
articles/455621/the-hsbc-dpa-approved-but-at-what-cost [https://perma.cc/3VX7-S86J]. It is
worth noting, however, that two district courts had already rejected settlement agreements
between companies and the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to Judge Gleeson’s
ruling. See, e.g., SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
vacated and remanded, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Tom Schoenberg & Andrew Zajac,
IBM Judge Questions SEC on Foreign Bribe Settlement, Bloomberg (Dec. 21, 2012, 9:49 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-12-20/ibm-judge-questions-sec-posture-on-
foreign-bribe-settlement-1- [https://perma.cc/3UPA-5RVE]. One district court’s order was va-
cated by the court of appeals, Citigroup, 752 F.3d 285, while the other district court ultimately
accepted the settlement. Tom Schoenberg, IBM Judge OKs Foreign Bribe Settlement Two Years
Later, Bloomberg (July 26, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
07-25/ibm-judge-approves-10-million-foreign-bribe-settlement-with-sec [https://perma.cc/XT
D8-MD44].
19. HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5. The idea that courts are more than just potted
plants suggests that courts can do more than sit by and do very little. In United States v. Fokker
Services, B.V., the district court made a similar characterization, noting that it was more than
just a “rubber stamp” for these agreements. 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated
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explanation of its role in considering such agreements, thereby raising im-
portant questions about the source and scope of courts’ authority and the
implications of courts’ involvement in what many consider to be
prosecutorial charging decisions.20
Two years later, another district court not only asserted its review au-
thority over DPAs but also rejected the agreement before it, concluding that
courts can reject DPAs when the terms are “grossly disproportionate” to the
alleged illegal conduct.21 In denying the parties’ joint-consent motion for
exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act,22 the court reasoned that “it
would undermine the public’s confidence in the administration of justice
and promote disrespect for the law” for a defendant to be “prosecuted so
anemically for engaging in such egregious conduct for such a sustained pe-
riod of time.”23 The court concluded that the terms of the agreement were
far too disproportionate for the underlying criminal conduct and rejected
the agreement.24 The Government appealed the district court’s order, and
on April 5, 2016, the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the case.25
Finally, in October 2015, a third district court concluded it had “the
authority to assess the reasonableness of a [DPA] and to decline to approve
agreements that are not genuinely designed to reform a defendant’s con-
duct.”26 It ultimately approved both of the DPAs before it but explained that
the Speedy Trial Act grants courts the authority to review such agreements
for “fairness and adequacy” to the extent that such review confirms that the
agreement’s purpose is to reform defendant conduct.27 It also found that the
supervisory power of courts permits rejection of a DPA in certain
instances.28
and remanded, No. 15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2016). The Government and
defendant Fokker Services appealed the district court’s denial in March 2015, and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia heard oral arguments on September 11, 2015. See Tran-
script of Oral Argument, Fokker, No. 15–3016 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11, 2015).
20. See The HSBC DPA, supra note 18.
21. Fokker, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 167.
22. This motion would allow the trial to commence after the 70-day maximum man-
dated by the Speedy Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2012).
23. Fokker, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 167.
24. Id. Judge Leon also concluded that the agreement was not an “appropriate exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.” Id. As discussed infra in Section IV, prosecutorial discretion is gener-
ally not reviewable by courts, and so perhaps the stronger argument for judicial rejection
relates to the court’s conclusions regarding whether the agreement served the interests of
justice.
25. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., No. 15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
5, 2016).
26. United States v. Saena Tech Corp., No. 1:14–CR–00066, 2015 WL 6406266, at *1
(D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015).
27. Id. at *16.
28. Id. at *17.
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After examining the source and scope of the court’s authority to review
and accept or reject DPAs, this Note contends that the district courts cor-
rectly asserted review authority over the agreements at issue and that the
D.C. Circuit erred in reaching the opposite conclusion. Part I discusses the
benefits and criticisms of the DOJ’s use of NPAs and DPAs. Part II describes
the three recent district court rulings as well as the court of appeals decision
concerning DPAs specifically. Part III evaluates the congressional grant of
review authority under the Speedy Trial Act and the contours and limits of
the supervisory authority of courts in reviewing DPAs for fairness. Part IV
contends that, although judicial oversight raises important concerns—in-
cluding possible violations of separation-of-powers principles and principles
of prosecutorial discretion—such oversight is constitutionally permissible.
Part V proposes that courts should review DPAs for substantive fairness,
absent additional direction from Congress.
I. Benefits and Criticisms of the Increased Use of
Non-Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution
Agreements by the U.S. Department of Justice
Federal prosecutors increasingly rely on NPAs and DPAs in the corpo-
rate context,29 and from a prosecutor’s perspective, there are many benefits
to doing so. NPAs and DPAs might punish a corporation more effectively
and efficiently than a criminal conviction.30 The agreements also allow pros-
ecutors to implement a variety of reforms within the corporation.31 Prosecu-
tors can impose reporting requirements, improvements to compliance
programs and policies, and a variety of remedial measures, including signifi-
cant fines.32 Prosecutors can also appoint a monitor to oversee the corpora-
tion’s activities for the term of the agreement.33 Additionally, prosecutors are
often able to avoid imposing the significant adverse collateral consequences
of a corporate criminal conviction on innocent third parties, such as share-
holders or employees.34 NPAs and DPAs are thus “an important middle
ground” between declining to prosecute and obtaining a corporate convic-
tion.35 Furthermore, when the DOJ chooses to use an NPA or DPA in the
29. See supra notes 2–10 and accompanying text.
30. See Remarks of Leslie R. Caldwell, supra note 4.
31. Garrett, supra note 17, at 861.
32. Remarks of Leslie R. Caldwell, supra note 4. For example, in 2015, the DOJ entered
into a DPA with Deutsche Bank AG, which included a $2.369 billion fine. 2015 Mid-Year
Update, supra note 8, at 2. In 2014, the DOJ entered into a DPA with Toyota, which resulted in
$1.2 billion in recovery. Garrett, supra note 4, at 1797.
33. Remarks by Leslie R. Caldwell, supra note 4.
34. Memorandum from Mark Filip, supra note 3, at 8. Consider, for example, the effect
of Arthur Andersen’s corporate criminal conviction for obstruction of justice in 2002. After
conviction, the “Big-Five” accounting firm went out of business and 28,000 employees lost
their jobs. Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 Stan. L. Rev.
271, 273 (2008).
35. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9–28.200 cmt.
(2015).
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corporate context, it saves time and money that it would otherwise spend on
a trial.36 The DOJ can preserve resources and pursue other prosecutions
where a criminal trial and conviction are necessary to achieve the same de-
gree of deterrence and punishment. Nonetheless, despite the variety of bene-
fits conferred by such pretrial diversion agreements, many commentators
have criticized the DOJ’s increased use of them.
Some criticize the increased use of such agreements insofar as they inad-
equately punish corporate defendants and allow corporations to avoid crim-
inal liability. For example, U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff has argued that
the internal compliance measures accompanying NPAs and DPAs are “often
little more than window-dressing.”37 Other commentators have raised
doubts about whether the collateral harm to shareholders and employees,
often referred to as the corporate death penalty, is a real concern in the
majority of DPA cases.38 Some have suggested that such agreements allow
companies to “bear the risk” of legally questionable business practices if they
think they can “cut a deal to defer their prosecution indefinitely.”39 For ex-
ample, Senator Elizabeth Warren has sharply criticized the DOJ’s pursuit of
such agreements as an end run around justice and meaningful punishment
for large, powerful corporations—“get-out-of-jail-free-cards for the biggest
corporations in the world.”40
Others criticize the use of NPAs and DPAs because such agreements
allow the DOJ to exact too much punishment from corporations without
having to demonstrate guilt at trial. Gibson Dunn, a law firm that often
36. See David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1295, 1303 (2013) (noting the
“need to conserve prosecutorial and judicial resources”).
37. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prose-
cuted?, N.Y. Rev. Books (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial
-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/3EJW-JH74]. Judge Rakoff’s critical
view is rooted in the more general criticism that in order to actually deter crime, prosecutors
should go after individuals in corporations rather than corporations themselves. Id. (stating
that prosecutors have increasingly prosecuted companies to try to “transform ‘corporate cul-
tures,’ ” but that “this approach has led to some lax and dubious behavior on the part of
prosecutors, with deleterious results”).
38. Uhlmann, supra note 36, at 1321 (citing Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the
Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 15 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 797 (2013)); see also Martin, supra note 14, at 469 (“Excluding Arthur
Andersen, no company indicted between 2001-2010 went out of business following a
conviction.”).
39. Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shift, Corporate Deals Replace Trials, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9,
2008, at A18; see also David M. Uhlmann, Justice Falls Short in G.M. Case, N.Y. Times, Sept.
20, 2015, at SR.5 (describing the DPA reached with General Motors over the ignition switch
failure as the latest example of the DOJ’s willingness to dismiss charges for egregious criminal
conduct).
40. Senator Elizabeth Warren, The Unfinished Business of Financial Reform: Remarks at
the Levy Institute’s 24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference (Apr. 15, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Unfinished_Business_20150415.
pdf [https://perma.cc/T5LP-A8GD].
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represents corporations negotiating NPAs and DPAs, rejects Senator War-
ren’s characterization as an oversimplification of the dynamic between cor-
porations and federal prosecutors.41 In the firm’s view, such agreements
impose not only a fine but also “rigorous compliance program reforms and
tighter accounting and internal control measures,” appointment of an
outside monitor to ensure compliance, self-investigation and reporting re-
quirements, support for any ongoing investigation by the DOJ, changes to
corporate board composition, and prohibitions on operations in certain
markets.42 By requiring much more than a fine, such agreements might get
corporations out of jail, but they are certainly not free.
According to Gibson Dunn, these requirements are not necessarily more
lenient than a guilty plea or a conviction.43 Corporations are on the hook for
the duration of the agreement and a prosecutor has unlimited ability to con-
clude that the corporation has failed to comply with the agreement’s terms,
revoke the agreement, and prosecute anyway.44 For instance, the DPA
reached with HSBC Bank provided that:
If, during the Term of this [DPA], the [DOJ] determines, in its sole discre-
tion, that the HSBC Parties have . . . breached the [DPA], the HSBC Parties
shall thereafter be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation
of which the [DOJ] has knowledge, including the charges in the
information . . . .45
Additionally, “[a]ny such prosecution may be premised on information pro-
vided by the HSBC Parties[,]”46 meaning the Government can rely on any
facts admitted by the corporation as part of the DPA. The agreement also
notes that such a prosecution would not be barred by the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations.47
41. 2015 Mid-Year Update, supra note 8, at 4–5.
42. Id. at 4.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 16, United States v. HSBC Bank USA,
N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) (No. 12–763) 2012 WL
6120512 [hereinafter HSBC DPA]; see also Remarks by Leslie R. Caldwell, supra note 4
(“Where we enter into DPAs, a criminal information is filed with the court and prosecution of
the information is deferred for the time of the agreement. Where a company fails to live up to
the terms of its agreement, an information is already filed, and we can tear up the agreement
and prosecute based on the admitted statement of facts. That’s a powerful incentive to live up
to the terms of the agreements.”).
45. HSBC DPA, supra note 44, at ¶ 16 (emphasis added).
46. Id. This means that the DOJ is able to use all the facts stipulated as accurate by HSBC
in the “Statement of Facts” attached to the DPA. That document included, among other ad-
missions, descriptions of HSBC’s “[f]ailure to obtain or maintain due diligence,” “[f]ailure to
adequately monitor over $200 trillion in wire transfers between 2006 and 2009,” and “[f]ailure
to adequately monitor billions of dollars in purchases of physical U.S. dollars . . . between July
2006 and July 2009.” Attachment A to Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 10, United States
v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) (No.
12–763) 2012 WL 6120512.
47. HSBC DPA, supra note 44, at ¶ 16. More specifically, the DPA provides that any
prosecution not time-barred by the statute of limitations at the time of the signing of the DPA
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Reaching an NPA or DPA with a corporation allows the Government to
avoid proving its case at trial. It allows the DOJ to push the bounds of what
constitutes criminal liability, because courts have not scrutinized the DOJ’s
interpretations of the applicable statutes.48 Furthermore, because alleged
wrongdoing is not tried in court, the Government has more flexibility to
reach agreements with different corporate defendants for similar conduct; it
is not bound by its past positions on criminal wrongdoing in the same way it
would be if it actually prosecuted.49
Thus far, this Note, like much of the scholarship on the subject, has
discussed NPAs and DPAs together. Although this Note contends that judi-
cial review of DPAs is proper and constitutionally permissible, it does not
suggest that similar judicial review of NPAs is appropriate. One criticism of
judicial review of DPAs is that the Government can simply pursue more
NPAs in response, thereby avoiding judicial review and continuing to divert
possible prosecutions from courts. If the result is the same—unreviewable,
out-of-court agreements between the Government and corporate defend-
ants—perhaps judicial review of DPAs fails to adequately address the
problems underlying both types of agreements. However, although there are
a number of similarities between NPAs and DPAs, several important legal
and practical differences between them warrant judicial review of DPAs but
not necessarily of NPAs.
NPAs and DPAs share a number of similarities. Both involve negotia-
tions between corporate defendants and the Government, both outline sub-
stantive terms that corporations must comply with in order to avoid
can be brought against HSBC, upon breach of the DPA, between the time of the signing and
expiration of the term of the DPA plus one year, despite the fact that the statute of limitations
would otherwise have expired. Id. Furthermore, the DOJ is also able to extend the term of a
DPA for what it considers, again in its sole discretion, to be violations of the agreement. Id. at
¶ 3. Although it often chooses to extend rather than rescind agreements entirely, the DOJ has,
in at least one instance, thrown out an NPA for breach and pursued a guilty plea. Press Re-
lease, Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas (May 20, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas [https://
perma.cc/XWG7-ABFW]. In that instance, the DOJ concluded that UBS had violated its NPA.
Id. As a result, UBS pled guilty to a one-count felony charge of wire fraud and paid a criminal
penalty of $203 million. Id.
48. See, e.g., Lauren Giudice, Note, Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Cur-
rent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 347, 366 (2011) (“Prosecutors
. . . enjoy a significant amount of discretion when negotiating and creating pre-trial diversion
agreements, which may make it difficult for corporations to know what to expect ex ante.”).
Many commentators have pressed this criticism particularly as it relates to the DOJ’s enforce-
ment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”), a statute enacted in 1977 to criminal-
ize the payment of bribes to foreign officials by corporations or individuals seeking business
opportunities. See, e.g., Barry J. Pollack & Laura Billings, After 30 Years of the FCPA, Will
Courts Finally Get into the Act?, Champion, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 34. Prosecutors have primarily
pursued NPAs and DPAs for enforcement, and very few cases have been brought to trial in the
thirty years the FCPA has been on the books. Id. This allows the DOJ, as well as the SEC, “wide
latitude to apply their interpretation of the FCPA” without case law limiting the scope of such
interpretations. Id.
49. See Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prose-
cution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1434, 1460 (2007).
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prosecution, and both raise similar concerns about the bargaining power of
the parties involved and whether the Government’s tactical use of the agree-
ments metes out justice fairly.50 Some argue large corporations come out the
winners, because they can write a check to the Government and continue on
without a conviction.51 Others argue the Government benefits because cor-
porations are basically forced to accept its terms in order to avoid prosecu-
tion, and are sufficiently threatened by the potential economic harm of an
indictment that they will agree to anything.52 And so, the big picture ques-
tions—such as whether we want the Government coming to terms with cor-
porations behind closed doors, largely without judicial or public scrutiny,
and whether we want alleged corporate criminals to be able to pay their way
out of prosecution so long as they promise not to do it again—might be
similar for both NPAs and DPAs.
Nevertheless, NPAs and DPAs differ significantly in legal and practical
respects and should be considered separately when evaluating the permissi-
bility of judicial review. Firstly, DPAs involve the filing of charges with a
court; no such charges are filed with NPAs.53 The filing of charges with a
court is significant to the defendant, the public, and the court itself. It sug-
gests a level of societal condemnation54 that is absent when the Government
enters into an NPA, where no charges are filed.55 Furthermore, the Govern-
ment’s decision not to prosecute (i.e., not to bring charges) is clearly outside
the scope of judicial review.56 Secondly, DPAs allow the Government to press
50. See supra text accompanying notes 30–40.
51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 49, at 1436.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 4–5.
54. See, e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 36, at 1300 (“The failure to prosecute [the corporate
defendant] sent a terrible message about how our society views corporate misconduct and
sowed doubts about the Justice Department’s commitment to address corporate crime.”);
David M. Uhlmann, For 29 Dead Miners, No Justice, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 2011, at A24 (noting
that NPAs and DPAs “create the appearance that justice can be bought”). Although Professor
Uhlmann argues that both NPAs and DPAs do not provide the necessary societal condemna-
tion, this Note contends that the filing of charges makes a difference.
55. Of course, DPAs, if complied with by corporations, ultimately result in the dismissal
of charges. Nevertheless, some amount of public condemnation still attaches, even if that con-
demnation is less than that which attaches to a conviction.
56. See infra Section IV.A. See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974),
superseded by statute, Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .” (internal citations omit-
ted)); United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (“Even a formal, written agreement . . . often referred to as a ‘non-
prosecution agreement,’ is not the business of the courts.”); Garrett, supra note 17, at 922
(explaining that this prosecutorial discretion is for the most part unreviewable, unless prose-
cutors make charging decisions based on invidious characteristics). Nevertheless, the Govern-
ment, in appealing the district court’s rejection of its DPA in United States v. Fokker Services
B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated and remanded, No. 15–3016, 2016 WL
1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2016), posited a similar argument with regards to the deferral of
prosecution, asserting that it is within the broad scope of prosecutorial power to decide
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pause on the applicable statute of limitations for the underlying offense57
since a court excuses the delay of prosecution for the filed charges under the
Speedy Trial Act.58 To the extent we worry that these types of pretrial agree-
ments create due process problems for corporate defendants, NPAs pose less
of a concern because the statute of limitations clock is running for the dura-
tion of the agreement.59 The Government gets less when it pursues an NPA
rather than a DPA: it does not generate the public condemnation achieved
by filing charges, and it is limited by statutes of limitations. And because the
Government gets less with NPAs, the DOJ might not in fact pursue them as
a means of avoiding the judicial review that would accompany DPAs. The
DOJ might instead decide to pursue more prosecutions in order to avoid the
perception that certain companies are “too big to jail.”60
II. Judicial Review of Deferred Prosecution Agreements
The significant increase in the use of DPAs by federal prosecutors has
resulted in “heightened judicial scrutiny” of those agreements,61 but the
source of authority for such scrutiny remains unclear. In 2013 and 2015,
three district courts asserted their authority to review DPAs, relying on the
Speedy Trial Act and the inherent supervisory power of courts. All of these
courts evaluated the substantive terms of the proposed DPAs and considered
how acceptance of the agreements at issue would affect the integrity of the
court as well as the public interest. Part II examines those district court
orders asserting judicial review authority over DPAs.
A. United States v. HSBC Bank U.S.A., N.A.
In United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., the district court considered a
proposed DPA for charges against HSBC for violations of the Bank Secrecy
Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Trading
with the Enemy Act.62 HSBC had failed to implement an effective
anti–money laundering program in connection with suspicious transactions
from Mexico.63 Due to that failure and the contemporaneous failure of one
of the Bank’s Mexican customers to properly implement its own
anti–money laundering policies, Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers
“launder[ed] at least $881 million in drug-trafficking proceeds through
HSBC Bank USA undetected.”64 The Government filed charges against
whether to defer prosecution, not just the decision whether to prosecute at all. See infra Sec-
tion II.B.
57. See, e.g., HSBC DPA, supra note 44.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012).
59. See, e.g., HSBC DPA, supra note 44, at ¶ 16.
60. This phrase is borrowed from Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail (2014).
61. 2013 Year-End Update, supra note 3, at 1.
62. No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
63. HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161, at *8.
64. Id.
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HSBC as well as a DPA and a Corporate Compliance Monitor agreement,
“requesting that the Court hold the case in abeyance for five years.”65
The proposed DPA included a variety of substantive terms. It required
that HSBC replace several individuals in leadership positions, such as its
chief executive officer, general counsel, and chief compliance officer, and
mandated that HSBC reorganize its anti–money laundering department to
increase its status within the company.66 It required the placement of a cor-
porate compliance monitor to supervise HSBC’s remedial measures and
ongoing compliance with a variety of statutes for the duration of the agree-
ment.67 The agreement contemplated that the monitor would report to the
DOJ on a regular basis and make “recommendations” to HSBC regarding
procedures with which HSBC was required to comply.68 Finally, the DPA
required that HSBC pay $1.256 billion in fines and admit to criminal
wrongdoing.69
Although the court initially evaluated its authority to accept or reject the
DPA under the same authorities as those which grant a court authority to
accept or reject a plea agreement,70 it later concluded that framework was
not applicable because the parties were not actually entering into a plea
agreement.71 It ultimately approved the DPA pursuant to its supervisory
power, placing the case in abeyance for five years under the Speedy Trial
Act.72 The court noted that it would continue to exercise its supervisory
power over the DPA’s implementation and asked the Government to file
quarterly reports with the court while the case was pending.73
65. Id. at *1.
66. See id. at *10.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *11.
70. Id. at *1. Courts have authority to accept or reject plea agreements pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A) and United States Sentencing Guidelines § 6B1.2.
Rule 11 states that “[a]n attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney, or the
defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a plea agreement.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(c)(1). Under the Guidelines Manual, a court “may accept” a plea agreement reached under
Rule 11—including the dismissal of any charges or an agreement not to pursue potential
charges—if the court concludes that “the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness
of the actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statu-
tory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 6B1.2(a) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2011).
71. HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161, at *2. The court asked the parties to brief whether
the DPA “adequately reflects the seriousness of the offense behavior and why accepting the
DPA would yield a result consistent with the goals of our federal sentencing scheme.” Id. at *1.
On a plain textual reading of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1), the parties had not
reached a plea agreement, over which the Rule would govern. Id. at *2. Similarly, the court
remarked that section 6B1.2 of the Guidelines Manual sets forth “[p]olicy statements gov-
erning the acceptance of plea agreements under Rule 11(c),” and because “the parties have . . .
no[t] entered a plea agreement . . . [the Guideline] is similarly inapplicable.” Id. at *2 n.4 (first
two alterations in original).
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id.
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The Speedy Trial Act allows for the exclusion of time with approval of
the court, “for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his
good conduct.”74 The statute itself does not define “good conduct,” but cor-
porations entering into such agreements seem to accept that “good conduct”
is whatever the DOJ determines it to be—monitoring, reporting require-
ments, improvements to compliance, and more.75 The Act also does not pro-
vide a standard of review for granting or rejecting a speedy trial waiver; it
just states that the exclusion of time requires court approval.76 Relying on
the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the court concluded that the
requirement of court approval was intended to prevent the parties from
“collud[ing] to circumvent the speedy trial clock.”77 In other words, the stat-
ute allows courts to evaluate whether the DPA is really about demonstrating
good conduct or rather a ploy on the part of both parties to stave off an
impending trial.78 Despite concluding that this agreement was clearly about
diversion, the court reasoned that approving the delay meant approving the
content of the DPA itself.79 In order to accept the delay as proper under the
exception contemplated by the Act, the court had to look at the substantive
terms of the DPA.80 Otherwise, its approval would be meaningless. After
evaluating these substantive measures, some of which it considered to be
“extraordinary,” the court approved the DPA.81
The court relied upon the “supervisory power” that “permits federal
courts to supervise ‘the administration of criminal justice’ among the parties
before the bar” to evaluate its power to approve or reject the DPA itself.82 As
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012). The Government and HSBC both argued that the
Speedy Trial Act supplied the applicable legal standard for the court because it contemplates
“Court[ ] approval for the exclusion of time.” HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161, at *2 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The defendant refers to the statutory language as providing a “stan-
dard.” Id. The Government refers to the statutory grant as a grant of authority, which is more
accurate because the statute does not provide substantive guidance for courts in reviewing
delays based on this exception to the speedy trial requirement. Id.
75. For instance, in accepting a DPA between the DOJ and the Union Bank of California,
the District Court for the Southern District of California noted the defendant’s willingness to
“acknowledge responsibility . . . continue its cooperation with the United State[s] . . . [and]
demonstrate its future good conduct and compliance in all material aspects with the Bank
Secrecy Act [which it was charged with violating] . . . including, but not limited to, the reme-
dial actions specified in [the DPA].” Deferred Prosecution Agreement at *3, United States v.
Union Bank of California, N.A., No. 07–CR–2566–W, 2007 WL 2906807 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18,
2007). There might be reasons, however, to challenge the widespread acceptance of the differ-
ent types of terms included in DPAs as methods for demonstrating “good conduct.” The statu-
tory language is itself ambiguous; the Speedy Trial Act does not provide examples or any kind
of limitations on what might count as a demonstration of such conduct.
76. § 3161(h)(2).
77. HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161, at *3.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at *7, *10–11.
81. Id. at *11.
82. Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980), and McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943)).
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the court noted, this power is traditionally exercised at the request of a party
before the court, such as a defendant making a claim of impropriety on the
part of the Government.83 In this case, neither party raised such a claim and
application of the supervisory power was, in the court’s view, novel.84 Ac-
cording to the court, “[o]ne of the primary purposes of the supervisory
power is to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.”85 And although, as
the court noted, the Government has “absolute discretion” in deciding not
to prosecute and “near-absolute power” under Rule 48(a) to “extinguish” a
case it has already brought,86 such discretion was unavailable here because
the Government pursued neither option, but rather sought to “implicate the
Court in the[ ] resolution.”87 Therefore, because the parties had placed a
criminal matter on the court’s docket, the court was able to exercise its au-
thority over the DPA.88
The decision in HSBC Bank provides a framework for evaluating judi-
cial review of DPAs but does not make clear whether a court needs only the
Speedy Trial Act or only its inherent supervisory power or both to review
and approve or reject a DPA. Although the statutory grant of judicial review
is enough to enable courts to assess DPAs, the lack of a clear standard for
review within the statute itself is problematic: courts need some basis for
asserting substantive review, especially where, as here, separation-of-powers
concerns are implicated. The supervisory power provides that basis, and past
invocations of the power provide guidance as to how it should be wielded by
courts in the DPA context. Furthermore, there is good reason to conclude
that Congress did not intend the Speedy Trial Act to conflict with, or under-
mine in any significant way, the long history of courts’ supervisory power in
the administration of criminal justice. If Congress had such an intent, it
would have articulated it more plainly. Therefore, courts can rely on their
inherent supervisory power to formulate an appropriate standard for such
review, absent additional congressional action providing substantive
guidance.
B. United States v. Fokker Services B.V.
In United States v. Fokker Services B.V.,89 the district court conducted an
analysis similar to that performed by the HSBC Bank court, asserting its
83. Id. at *6.
84. Id. As will be discussed infra in Section IV.B, exercise of the supervisory power here
might not in fact be as novel as the court suggests.
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id. at *5. The court went on to quote United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1033
n.5 (2d Cir. 1991), where the Second Circuit stated that “[a] court is generally required to
grant a prosecutor’s Rule 48(a) motion unless dismissal is ‘clearly contrary to manifest public
interest.’ ” HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5.
87. HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5.
88. Id.
89. 79 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated and remanded, No. 15–3016, 2016 WL
1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2016).
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authority to review the proposed DPA pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act and
the court’s supervisory power. The Fokker court ultimately rejected the DPA
because it did not punish the corporate defendant sufficiently.90 The Gov-
ernment had charged Fokker Services with “Conspiracy to Unlawfully Ex-
port U.S.-Origin Goods and Services to Iran, Sudan and Burma.”91 The
parties filed a joint motion for exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act,
in conjunction with a DPA.92 In February 2015, the district court denied the
motion, concluding that accepting it would “undermine the public’s confi-
dence in the administration of justice” and would “promote disrespect for
the law” if a defendant was “prosecuted so anemically for engaging in such
egregious conduct for such a sustained period of time and for the benefit of
one of our country’s worst enemies.”93 Fokker Services was charged with
violating and evading export laws for five years “for the benefit, largely, of
Iran and its military during the post–9/11 world,” bringing in $21 million in
revenue from the illegal transactions.94 The DPA, however, contemplated
dismissal of the charges if Fokker Services paid a fine of $10.5 million, coop-
erated with the Government, implemented a compliance program, and
complied with U.S. export laws for 18 months.95 Although Fokker Services
owed $10.5 million in fines to other agencies, it would not have been re-
quired to pay anything more than the $21 million it gained in revenue from
the illegal conduct.96 The DPA did not call for the prosecution of any re-
sponsible individuals, it allowed a number of employees directly involved to
remain at the company, and it did not require an independent monitor or
any reports to the court or the Government to verify compliance.97
The court addressed similar questions to those raised and analyzed by
the HSBC Bank court. The parties again relied upon the exclusion under the
Speedy Trial Act for good conduct on the part of the defendant98 and, in
seeking the court approval required under the statutory exclusion, main-
tained that the role of the court was extremely limited.99 In rejecting these
limits on its authority, the court pointed to the same inherent “supervisory
power” described in HSBC Bank.100 It reasoned that the purpose of the
90. Fokker, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 167.
91. Id. at 161.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 167. Fokker Services, for a period of five years from 2005 to 2011, exported
aircraft parts, technology, and services to sanctioned countries Iran, Sudan, and Burma with-
out obtaining a license. Id. at 162–63. Gross revenue from the illegal shipments totaled $21
million. Id. at 163.
94. Id. at 166.
95. Id. at 164.
96. Id. at 166.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 164 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 165.
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court’s supervisory power was to “protect the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess”101 and to ensure that “the courts do not lend a judicial imprimatur to
any aspect of a criminal proceeding that smacks of lawlessness or impropri-
ety.”102 By keeping the case on the docket, rather than not bringing charges
or dismissing the case altogether, the Government was essentially asking the
court to “serve as a rubber stamp”103 and “lend its judicial imprimatur to
their DPA.”104 The court noted that the parties sought to use its judicial
authority in the future should the defendant not comply with the terms of
the agreement and reasoned that the parties were essentially asking the court
to “serve as the leverage over the head of the company.”105 The court deter-
mined that it had to consider the public as well as the defendant in preserv-
ing the court’s integrity.106 It concluded that approving the lenient DPA
would call into question the integrity of judicial proceedings in the same
way “overly-zealous prosecutorial conduct” would.107
The Government appealed and on April 5, 2016, the D.C. Circuit va-
cated the district court’s order and remanded the case.108 The Court of Ap-
peals held that the Speedy Trial Act “confers no authority in a court to
withhold exclusion of time pursuant to a DPA based on concerns that the
government should bring different charges or should charge different de-
fendants.”109 It relied upon the “long-settled understandings about the inde-
pendence of the Executive” in making charging decisions and concluded
that, in passing the Speedy Trial Act, Congress did not intend to disrupt that
history.110 Contrary to the conclusion reached by the D.C. Circuit, this Note
contends that the Speedy Trial Act does grant courts the authority to review
DPAs and that such authority is also supported by courts’ general supervi-
sory power.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL
3306161, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013)).
103. Id. at 164 (citations omitted). The court explained that this “rubber stamp” function
did not apply in two situations: where there was an indication that the defendant did not enter
into the agreement “willingly and knowingly,” and where it appeared that that agreement was
specifically designed to “circumvent the Speedy Trial Act limits.” Id.
104. Id. at 165.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 166.
107. Id.
108. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., No. 15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266, at *1–2 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 5, 2016).
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id.
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C. United States v. Saena Tech Corporation
In United States v. Saena Tech Corp.,111 the district court approved the
DPA at issue, but asserted review authority over the agreement pursuant to
the Speedy Trial Act and the court’s supervisory power. The Government
charged Saena Tech, a South Korea–based subcontractor for federal govern-
ment contractors, with bribery of a public official because Saena Tech had
made payments totaling $280,000 to a federal government employee in or-
der to obtain and retain certain government subcontracts.112 Shortly after
filing charges against Saena Tech, the Government filed a joint motion for
exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act and for approval of its contem-
plated DPA with the defendant.113 The DPA imposed a fine of $500,000 and
required implementation of a compliance program as well as cooperation
from the defendant in ongoing investigations.114 It included a “Statement of
Facts,” in which Saena Tech admitted the underlying facts and agreed that
those admitted facts could be used against it if the Government pursued
prosecution in the future.115 The agreement also gave the Government “sole
discretion” to determine whether the defendant had breached the agreement
such that subsequent prosecution was warranted.116 Finally, the DPA pro-
vided that the statute of limitations for the underlying offense would be
tolled for the duration of the agreement.117
The district court first turned to the statutory grant of judicial review
contained in the Speedy Trial Act, concluding that the legislative history
“demonstrates that Court involvement” was “specifically intended by Con-
gress when it passed [the Act.]”118 It ultimately concluded that its review
authority under the Speedy Trial Act was tied to the underlying purpose of
the Act itself and was thus “limited to assessing whether the agreement is
truly about diversion.”119 It found that approval of a DPA should be granted
“when the agreement is intended to hold prosecution in abeyance while a
defendant demonstrates good conduct.”120 It determined, furthermore, that
such limited authority involved review of the “fairness and adequacy of an
agreement,” to the extent that such review revealed whether the agreement
111. No. 1:14–CR–00066, 2015 WL 6406266 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015). The district court
consolidated two cases, both involving charges of bribery of a public official. Because the
underlying facts are substantially similar and the court’s legal analysis is the same, Saena Tech
Corp, 2015 WL 6406266, at *21, only Saena Tech is discussed here.
112. Id. at *3. As the district court noted, the amount of money the defendant earned
from the obtained subcontracts was “unclear.” Id.
113. Id. at *4.
114. Id. at *4–5.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *12. The court described the development of the provision contemplating court
approval, as discussed infra in Section III.A.
119. Id. at *16.
120. Id.
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was truly aimed at reforming defendant conduct.121 Accordingly, the court
concluded it had more review authority than the “largely administrative au-
thority contemplated by the government,”122 but less than plenary review.123
The court found that the contemplated DPA was more than mere “window-
dressing” and that it therefore should not be rejected under the Speedy Trial
Act.124
The district court also recognized that it had authority to review the
DPA pursuant to its supervisory power because the parties had asked it to
“place its formal imprimatur on the agreement[ ], to hold open [a] federal
case[ ], and to make various findings with respect to the Speedy Trial Act.”125
Nevertheless, the court concluded review under this authority was similarly
limited and that rejection of an agreement was proper only if “a court’s
integrity might truly be imperiled.”126 Because the agreement at issue did
not involve “unlawful or untoward collusion,” the supervisory power did
not warrant its denial.127
III. Sources of Authority to Review and Reject DPAs
Courts have authority to review DPAs by way of a congressional grant of
review authority under the Speedy Trial Act. The statute plainly contem-
plates district court involvement and review in the delay of trial for demon-
stration of good conduct by the defendant.128 To the extent that the statute
fails to provide substantive guidance as to the proper standard a court
should apply in approving or rejecting a DPA, the courts’ authority to re-
view for fairness is supported by its general supervisory power to “supervise
‘the administration of criminal justice’ among the parties before the bar.”129
121. Id.
122. Id. The court referenced nine factors proposed by amicus to evaluate DPAs:
(1) reasonableness of any fines or other punitive measures; (2) compliance-related safe-
guards; (3) independent corporate monitors to supervise compliance; (4) cooperation
with authorities in ongoing investigations; (5) the lack of unrelated requirements that
might require judicial intervention; (6) potential collateral consequences of the agree-
ment; (7) the appropriateness of restitution to any victims; (8) the effect of the agreement
on other regulators; and (9) the effect of the period of delay on statutes of limitations or
other interests[ ].
Id. The court went on to note, citing Fokker, that an agreement containing some of those
elements might still be ineffective. Id.
123. Id. at *15.
124. See id. at *21.
125. Id. at *18.
126. Id. at *19.
127. Id. at *21.
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012).
129. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943)).
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A. The Speedy Trial Act
In asserting review authority over DPAs, the HSBC Bank, Fokker, and
Saena Tech courts initially turned to the statutory grant of power in the
Speedy Trial Act, enacted by Congress in 1974.130 The statutory text provides
that “the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with
the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the
filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment.”131 The
Act specifically enumerates periods of delay that must be excluded from the
seventy-day maximum,132 including “[a]ny period of delay during which
prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to
written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the
purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”133
In reversing the Fokker district court’s ruling, the D.C. Circuit con-
cluded that there was “no ground” for reading the Act’s “approval of the
court” language as “confer[ring] free-ranging authority in district courts to
scrutinize the prosecution’s discretionary charging decisions.”134 Instead, be-
cause the executive branch has authority to initiate charges against criminal
defendants and to select what charges to bring against those defendants, it
concluded that the district court erred in rejecting the DPA.135 As discussed
infra, however, some type of judicial review of DPAs does not impermissibly
interfere with charging decisions, because such review evaluates the punitive
effects of those decisions rather than the decisions themselves.
In its appeal of the Fokker district court’s rejection of the DPA, the Gov-
ernment argued that “approval of the court” applies only to an assessment
of whether the agreement is “for the purpose of allowing the defendant to
demonstrate his good conduct,”136 because “with approval of the court”
modifies that subsequent term and not the preceding phrase, which states
that “prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant
to written agreement with the defendant.”137
130. § 3161; see also United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164 (D.D.C.
2015), vacated and remanded, No. 15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2016); United
States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. July 1,
2013).
131. § 3161(c)(1).
132. Id. § 3161(h).
133. Id. § 3161(h)(2) (emphasis added).
134. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., No. 15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266, at *4 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 5, 2016).
135. Id. at *4–10.
136. Opening Brief for the United States at 40, United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., No.
15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2016) (No. 15–3016), 2015 WL 4480884 (quot-
ing § 3161(h)(2)).
137. Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Order Below at 26, Fokker,
2016 WL 1319266 (No. 15–3016), 2015 WL 4062296 (quoting § 3161(h)(2)). Essentially, the
Government argued that courts can “ensure that the government and defendant have entered
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The proper textual reading of the Act, however, provides for a broader
conception of court approval, one supported by the legislative history of the
Act. As the court-appointed amicus argued in its appeal brief to the D.C.
Circuit in the Fokker case, the Government’s interpretation is incorrect “[a]s
a matter of English grammar.”138  It explained:
A simple example establishes the point. Consider the following statement:
“I can take the car, with my parents’ approval, for purposes of picking up
groceries.” A person making that statement is not saying that his parents’
discretion is solely limited to determining whether his subjective purpose is
to pick up groceries. Rather, he means that he is allowed to take the car in
order to pick up groceries, as long as his parents also approve. Section
3161(h)(2) is no different: time is excluded if the Government defers pros-
ecution in order to allow a defendant to demonstrate good behavior, as
long as the court also approves.139
On its face, the exception plainly contemplates a judicial role in deciding
whether to exclude delays for deferral of prosecution based on defendants’
good conduct. And the legislative history confirms that textual reading. The
Senate Report, in explaining the exception, noted that it “assures that the
court will be involved in the decision to divert and that the procedure will
not be used by prosecutors and defense counsel to avoid the speedy trial
time limits.”140 Indeed, in an early version of the bill, the exception did not
include the words “with the approval of the court.”141 During the 1971 Sen-
ate Hearings on the statute, one senator argued that because deferrals have
“some of the elements of a plea bargain and  result in pro tanto waiver of the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial, approval by the court on the record is a
wise and necessary safeguard.”142 Of course, the “approval of the court” lan-
guage was added.143
The legislative history also suggests that the purpose of this judicial role
was to protect and preserve the societal interest in reducing crime and recid-
ivism.144 The Act was also intended to protect individual defendants, ensur-
ing swift resolution of criminal charges to “prevent undue and oppressive
into the DPA for an appropriate ‘purpose,’ rather than to evade Speedy Trial Act time limita-
tions,” but more intrusive review of the agreement itself is not authorized. Opening Brief for
the United States, supra note 136, at 40.
138. Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Order Below, supra note 137,
at 26.
139. Id. at 27.
140. S. Rep. No. 93-1021, at 37 (1974).
141. Anthony Partridge, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Legislative History of Title I of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, at 116 (1980).
142. Id.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012).
144. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1508, at 8 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 7401–02 (“The
purpose of this bill is to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring
speedy trials . . . .”); id. at 15 (“The Committee believes that the right to a speedy trial belongs
not only to the defendant, but to society as well.”); see also J. Andrew Read, Comment, Open-
Ended Continuances: An End Run Around the Speedy Trial Act, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 733, 739
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pretrial incarceration,” reduce the likelihood of lost memories or the disap-
pearance of witnesses, and “minimize the anxiety and suspicion aroused by
public accusation.”145 But, as the Senate Report explained, because the Act is
also protective of a societal right, “a defendant ought not be permitted to
waive rights that are not his or hers alone to relinquish.”146
The understanding that the purpose of the Speedy Trial Act was to pro-
tect societal rights was not limited to Congress. In subsequent interpreta-
tions of other provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court concluded that it
was intended to provide for judicial consideration of possible delays in order
to protect and promote the public interest. In Zedner v. United States, where
the Court considered whether a defendant could waive application of the
Act and accept a continuance, the Court concluded that the Act was not just
designed for individual defendants but was intended to “serve the public
interest” by minimizing “defendants’ opportunity to commit crimes while
on pretrial release and preventing extended pretrial delay from impairing the
deterrent effect of punishment.”147 The Court ultimately denied exclusion of
the delay despite the defendant’s consent, because “the Act was designed
with the public interest firmly in mind.”148
The Speedy Trial Act functions to protect more than just the defendant’s
right to a speedy trial; it also serves as a safeguard for the public interest in
criminal justice. This additional purpose can provide guidance about the
proper role of the judiciary in reviewing delays pursuant to a DPA. It cer-
tainly gives weight to the argument that judicial review of DPAs between the
Government and corporate defendants is necessary to ensure the public is
protected from undue delays. It might suggest that judicial review is neces-
sary to protect the public from improper leniency in punishment, similar to
the type of review in other areas where criminal charges are resolved, such as
plea agreements and withdrawn charges.149
Perhaps this public interest is already sufficiently advanced and pre-
served by prosecutors, who are tasked not only with building cases against
criminal defendants, but also with pursuing fair and just outcomes.150 Why
(1997) (describing Congress’s intent “not only to quantify an individual’s right to a speedy
trial” but to increase deterrence and reduce recidivism).
145. Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H.R. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 3 (1974) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the
Subcomm. on Crime Hearings on Speedy Trial Legislation).
146. S. Rep. No. 96-212, at 29 (1979).
147. 547 U.S. 489, 501 (2006).
148. Zedner, 547 U.S. at 501. The Court pointed to another exception within § 3161(h)
which requires a district court to find “that the ends of justice served [by the delay] . . .
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial” before excluding a
delay resulting from a continuance. Id. (quoting § 3161(h)(8)(A)).
149. See infra notes 214–221 and accompanying text.
150. Courts have stated that a prosecutor’s aim is to protect the public interest in criminal
justice. For example, in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), the Court noted that
the U.S. Attorney represents “a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as com-
pelling as its obligation to govern at all” and emphasized that a prosecutor’s interest is not
necessarily in winning but in ensuring that justice is done.
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should we conclude that it is for the judiciary to protect the public interest
in speedy trials and fair DPAs? Or, if the judiciary has a role to play in
protecting the public interest, why is substantive review of DPAs the proper
means for it to do so? Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that the
judiciary is the proper institution to protect the public interest and that sub-
stantive review of DPAs is the appropriate means, is it constitutional for
courts to engage in such review? This Note confronts these questions in Part
IV. First, it turns to the other source of authority identified by district courts
in reviewing DPAs—their supervisory power.
B. The Supervisory Power
Although the Speedy Trial Act itself provides a specific and sufficient
grant of statutory authority to courts to review DPAs, the broader supervi-
sory power, identified by the HSBC Bank, Fokker, and Saena Tech courts,
bolsters that review authority and provides helpful guidance in articulating a
proper standard of review for the future. In particular, it provides courts
with the authority to protect and promote the public interest in just out-
comes and speedy resolutions of criminal trials. Section III.B.1 explores the
source of this authority and examines three different areas where federal
courts have asserted it: court administration, sanctions, and the administra-
tion of criminal justice. Although the first two areas are useful in under-
standing how the supervisory power works and interacts with congressional
action, the third is the most important in the context of DPAs. Section
III.B.2 turns to the scope of the supervisory power and defends courts’ reli-
ance on it in reviewing DPAs.
1. Assertions of Courts’ Supervisory Power
The federal courts have long exercised powers not expressly granted in
the Constitution or through an act of Congress. These “inherent powers” are
“those which ‘cannot be dispensed with . . . because they are necessary to the
exercise of all others.’ ”151 They “consist of all powers reasonably required to
enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dig-
nity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective.”152
Although the scope of a court’s inherent authority is contested among
151. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Consti-
tution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 738 (2001) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43
(1991)). In the civil context, inherent authority has been defined as “the authority of a trial
court . . . to control and direct the conduct of civil litigation without any express authorization
in a constitution, statute, or written rule of court.” Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Author-
ity in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1805, 1805 (1995). The authority “flows
from the powers possessed by a court simply because it is a court; it is an authority that
inheres in the very nature of a judicial body and requires no grant of power other than that
which creates the court and gives it jurisdiction.” Id.
152. Meador, supra note 151, at 1808 (quoting Bankers Tr. Co. v. Braten, 420 N.Y.S.2d
584, 589 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)). These inherent powers “exist because the court exists.” Id. This
inherent authority is derived from English common law courts, which possessed the authority
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courts and commentators, few, if any, question its existence.153 Indeed,
courts have relied upon these powers to act in a variety of different ways and
in a variety of different contexts, many of which do not appear essential.154
To understand the particular type of inherent authority proposed in the
context of DPAs—and why this authority presents questions related to con-
stitutional structure—it is necessary to first explain the variety of contexts in
which federal courts have exercised this authority. Generally, courts have
exercised this inherent power in three different areas: court administration,
sanctions, and the administration of criminal justice.155
With regard to court administration, courts are generally able to “ensure
the orderly, expeditious, and efficient administration of justice.”156 Judges
can consolidate cases involving common questions of law and fact,157 decide
the order in which certain cases will be heard, set the time for different
hearings and trials, and determine whether to grant continuances, recesses
and stays.158 In many ways, the courts’ need to invoke their inherent author-
ity in court administration has been obviated as Congress has passed a num-
ber of procedural rules expressly granting, and indeed expanding, the courts’
power to manage litigation. Such legislation includes rules requiring the
early submission of a case management plan, attendance at pretrial confer-
ences, and supervision of discovery.159 Judges, moreover, have claimed even
broader managerial powers, such as the power to dismiss cases because their
dockets are too full, to force parties to settle, and to require summary jury
trials.160 Courts have also protected their independent authority to take ad-
ministrative action, even when such action is in tension with congressional
directions. In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., the Court concluded that federal
courts possess inherent authority to dismiss a case sua sponte for want of
prosecution161 despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which provides
that a defendant may move for a dismissal “for failure of the plaintiff to
to control parties appearing before them and to ensure that the judicial process was not
abused. Id. at 1805–06.
153. Id. at 1806.
154. Pushaw, supra note 151, at 738.
155. For an in-depth discussion of these three different categories of inherent power, see
id. at 760–82.
156. Id. at 760.
157. Meador, supra note 151, at 1807–08; Pushaw, supra note 151, at 760. Meador ex-
plains that this “discretionary authority” to consolidate is viewed “as an inseparable aspect of
the powers possessed by common-law and equity courts.” Meador, supra note 151, at 1807.
Congress has since authorized such consolidation authority in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Id. at 1807–08.
158. Pushaw, supra note 151, at 760–61.
159. Id. at 762–63. For the argument that this more “activist” judicial management is in
conflict with and undermines our traditional adversarial system, see Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982).
160. Pushaw, supra note 151, at 763–64 (citing Meador, supra note 151, at 1805–11; and
then citing Resnik, supra note 159, at 396).
161. 370 U.S. 626, 630–32 (1962).
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prosecute.”162 The Court concluded that Rule 41(b) did not “abrogate the
power of courts, acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of
cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of
the parties seeking relief.”163
Courts have also exercised their inherent supervisory power when im-
posing sanctions as a means to protect the judicial process by controlling
and managing the individuals appearing before them.164 In addition to this
inherent authority to sanction, Congress has enacted a variety of statutes
and rules designed not only to ratify judges’ sanctioning power but also to
provide courts with substantive guidance to prevent judicial abuse.165 De-
spite such legislation, courts continue to act based on their inherent author-
ity rather than simply relying on legislative grants.166 In Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., the Court concluded that the federal statutes and rules related
to the courts’ sanctioning power did not “displace[ ] the inherent power” of
courts to supplement legislative action.167 In that case, the Court imposed
attorneys’ fees as a sanction,168 contrary to the general American rule that
each party is responsible for paying its own attorneys’ fees. The Court ex-
plained, “[t]hese other mechanisms, taken alone or together, are not substi-
tutes for the inherent power . . . . At the very least, the inherent power must
continue to exist to fill in the interstices.”169
162. Pushaw, supra note 151, at 761 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). Indeed, in an earlier
case, Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 207 (1958), the Court concluded that the Rule limited dismissals to defendants’
motions.
163. Link, 370 U.S. at 630. Pushaw argues that the majority improperly ignored the fact
that interpreting procedural laws as not restricting the inherent powers of a court could “frus-
trate Congress’s will and infringe the Due Process rights of the plaintiff.” Pushaw, supra note
151, at 761. Pushaw also points to Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), where the
Court determined that federal trial judges could use forum non conveniens to dismiss cases
properly brought in their jurisdictions if they thought it was more appropriate for another
court to hear the case. Pushaw, supra note 151, at 761. Congress later ratified the ruling by
passing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). Even that statute does not provide judges with the power
to dismiss suits if they conclude that a foreign or state tribunal is more appropriate, but federal
judges have done so anyway. Pushaw, supra note 151, at 761–62, 762 n.119.
164. Pushaw, supra note 151, at 764–65 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44
(1991)).
165. Pushaw lists the variety of statutes and rules relating to the judicial-sanctioning
power. See id. at 765. They include federal statutes granting district judges the power to fine or
imprison for contempt, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012), and to assess attorneys’ fees against any attor-
ney who “multiplies the proceedings . . . unreasonably and vexatiously,” id. § 1927, as well as
Federal Rules allowing judges to sanction parties who file groundless pleadings and motions,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, disobey pretrial orders, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f), subpoenas, Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(g), or attach an affidavit in a summary judgment motion in bad faith, Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(h).
166. Pushaw, supra note 151, at 766.
167. 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991).
168. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 35.
169. Id. at 46. Relying on its reasoning in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626,
630–32 (1962), the Court concluded that “the inherent power of a court can be invoked even if
procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49. Dissenting
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Finally, the federal courts assert inherent authority in a variety of con-
texts related to the administration of criminal justice.170 As the district court
recognized in HSBC Bank, the courts have used this power substantively—
overturning convictions secured using improper evidence171—and also pro-
cedurally—as a means of “fashion[ing] ‘civilized standards of procedure and
evidence’ applicable to federal criminal proceedings.”172 For instance, in Bal-
lard v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that the “purposeful and
systematic exclusion” of women from juries conflicted with the “scheme of
jury selection” adopted by Congress,173 even though the disqualifications
prohibited by Congress did not include one based on juror sex.174 The Court
concluded that the congressional scheme was committed to empaneling ju-
ries that are representative of the community, and it exercised its “power of
supervision over the administration of justice” to reverse the conviction im-
posed by the lower court.175 The Court determined that representative juries
were necessary to the fair administration of criminal justice and exercised its
supervisory power to complete the task started by Congress.
In McNabb v. United States, the Court again exercised its supervisory
power beyond that authorized by specific congressional legislation.176 The
lower court had convicted the defendant based on confession evidence ob-
tained during two days of continuous questioning without friends or coun-
sel present.177 The Supreme Court overturned the convictions and reasoned
that while there was no legislation specifically governing the collection of
evidence by federal law enforcement officers from persons in custody, “a
decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of justice and custodians of
liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence secured under
Justice Kennedy took issue with this determination, explaining that inherent powers “are the
exception, not the rule” and that assertion of that power must be “necessary to preserve the
authority of the court.” Id. at 64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). “[A]t the very least a court need not
exercise inherent power if Congress has provided a mechanism to achieve the same end.” Id.
170. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943)) (“The supervisory power . . . permits federal courts to super-
vise ‘the administration of criminal justice’ among the parties before the bar.”).
171. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
172. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (quoting McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340).
173. 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
174. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 191. It also noted that Congress allowed a number of specific
exemptions from jury service “so as not to incur an unnecessary expense, or unduly burden
the citizens of any part of the district.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 413 (2012)).
175. Id. at 191–93.
176. 318 U.S. at 345.
177. Id. The Court also described a federal law requiring that an arresting officer take the
defendant before a judicial officer for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial. Id. at
342. The officers in McNabb failed to do so before questioning the defendants. Id. at 344–45.
Although the statute was relevant to the Court as it related to congressional policy on federal
criminal procedure, its decision to overturn the convictions was premised on the “effective
administration of criminal justice.” Id. at 347.
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the circumstances revealed here.”178 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
noted that the “administration of criminal justice hardly requires disregard
of fair procedures imposed by law”179 and found that admitting the confes-
sions would improperly enlist the court in “willful disobedience of [the]
law.”180
The Court has exercised its supervisory authority rather broadly in the
administration of criminal justice. It has used that authority to ensure that
procedures used either during criminal trials or during the collection of evi-
dence comport with basic conceptions of fairness, and it has used that au-
thority to provide a remedy when such basic fairness is violated. Moreover,
the Court has done so by inferring from apparent congressional intent—as
was the case in Ballard—and by expanding on congressional directives—as
was the case in McCarthy v. United States. In the DPA context, Congress has
authorized some types of judicial review through the Speedy Trial Act; there-
fore, ensuring basic fairness for a corporate defendant seems well within the
supervisory power of courts.
2. The Supervisory Authority in the DPA Context
The Fokker, HSBC Bank, and Saena Tech courts referenced the cases dis-
cussed above in support of their assertion of supervisory power in the DPA
context. However, the specific contours of the supervisory power are not
entirely clear from the case law. Courts can exercise their supervisory power
when it is abundantly clear that justice is being circumvented. But again, it is
difficult to find a clear explanation of when such circumvention occurs be-
cause the Court has exercised the supervisory power in such a wide variety
of contexts.181 The Supreme Court’s conclusory analysis of the power, espe-
cially in the criminal justice context, provides little guidance as to its scope.
In fact, lower courts rarely exercise the supervisory power, and the Supreme
Court has rejected their attempts to do so outside of restricted circum-
stances.182 When courts do exercise the supervisory power, it is often when a
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 345. The Court has also relied on its supervisory power to come up with a
remedy for a district court’s failure to comply with a federal rule of procedure, despite the fact
that the rule itself did not provide that remedy. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,
463, 472 (1969), the Supreme Court concluded that the district judge, in accepting the defen-
dant’s plea, did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and reversed the
judgment of conviction. In so holding, the Court explained that its decision about the proper
remedy for noncompliance with Rule 11 was “based solely upon [its] construction of Rule 11”
and was “made pursuant to [its] supervisory power.” Id. at 463–64. In this way, the Court
relied on a congressional directive, Rule 11, but used its supervisory power to allow the defen-
dant to plead again.
181. See supra Section III.B.1.
182. For instance, in United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980), the Court held that
the supervisory power “does not authorize a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible
evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court.”
In light of the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions, the district court erred in concluding
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defendant seeks redress for some impropriety committed by the Govern-
ment.183 In the DPA context, however, defendants sign on to the agreements
and are not alleging any such impropriety.184
Reliance on the supervisory power in the DPA context is nevertheless
permissible because of the Speedy Trial Act: courts can rely on the baseline
review authority granted in the Act and can also exercise their supervisory
power to effectuate its purposes. Specifically, courts can review DPAs for
substantive fairness in order to protect the defendant and the public. The
Supreme Court has allowed lower courts to use the supervisory power when
the impropriety is clear, such as when due process is violated, and perhaps
when Congress has provided some indication of the proper outcome—for
example, by creating a “scheme” for representative juries.185 Such a supervi-
sory role by courts, however, might not be appropriate when it conflicts
with established jurisprudence or lacks some concrete congressional direc-
tive, such as federal rules or statutes.186 In the case of DPAs and judicial
review of delay periods under the Speedy Trial Act, it is clear Congress in-
tended some type of judicial review.187 Although courts would be on much
stronger ground had Congress provided a substantive review standard, the
supervisory authority suggests courts can fill in these statutory gaps, absent
and until other congressional action. Indeed, the statutory language indi-
cates that the exercise of the supervisory power is in line with previous inter-
pretations of the power by the Supreme Court.
One might argue that because this authority is not constrained by a
specific standard in the statute, courts not only have the unequivocal author-
ity to review DPAs but are in fact entitled to use their complete discretion in
evaluating DPAs. According to this reasoning, the statutory grant authorizes
courts to assess DPAs without relying on their supervisory power, so they
are not restricted by any past interpretations of its proper use. Although this
Note contends that the statutory grant in the Speedy Trial Act provides
courts with the limited power to substantively review DPAs, there are rea-
sons to question whether courts have such broad power based upon the
statutory language alone. In other areas of criminal justice, such as plea
that society’s interest in deterring bad-faith conduct by police officers outweighed society’s
interest in providing the trier of fact with all the evidence. Id. at 736–37. To hold otherwise
would be to “confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limita-
tions of the law it is charged with enforcing.” Id. at 737.
183. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (citing United States v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2000)).
184. Id.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 173–175.
186. United States v. Saena Tech Corp., No. 1:14–CR–00066, 2015 WL 6406266, at *18
(D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015) (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254
(1988)) (“Even if exercised in a ‘sensible and efficient’ fashion, it ‘is invalid if it conflicts with
constitutional or statutory provisions.’ ”).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 140–143.
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agreements, courts have exercised caution when involving themselves signifi-
cantly in negotiations between prosecutors and defendants, and similar con-
siderations apply in the DPA context.188
Some might argue that judicial evaluation of the underlying facts lead-
ing to an agreement between the defendant and the Government is inappro-
priate and outside the institutional competence of the courts. It is hard to
imagine any other type of practicable review other than all-but-absolute def-
erence to the prosecutor. Such deference, however, is already given to the
Government’s decisions not to prosecute, like in the case of NPAs. Some
might argue that the Speedy Trial Act allows judicial review only to prevent
the parties from colluding to circumvent the Act in an attempt to prevent a
trial from going forward. But it is not clear how cabining judicial review in
this way does any work: DPAs by definition operate to preclude trial. Fur-
thermore, as the district court judges pointed out in HBSC Bank, Fokker,
and Saena Tech, the Government, in requesting a delay, is asking for a judi-
cial “stamp of approval” that carries with it the approval of the judiciary in
the eyes of the public.189 The implications of that approval—and the nega-
tive consequences for the courts and criminal justice system should it be
given without careful consideration—warrant something more than the def-
erence given to the Government in non-prosecution decisions. Rather, “by
placing the DPA on [a c]ourt’s radar screen in the form of a pending crimi-
nal matter,” the parties have “submitted to far more judicial authority.”190
Additionally, DPAs often call for court sanctions if defendants fail to comply
with their terms. A court should be able to evaluate a DPA before using its
enforcement power to sanction a noncomplying defendant.
The supervisory power allows courts to step in and ensure that justice is
properly administered. Courts can exercise this power to expand on congres-
sional directives in order to promote just outcomes. In this context, Con-
gress has already contemplated a judicial role, and the supervisory power
operates to fill in the remaining gaps.
IV. Executive Power and Prosecutorial Discretion
The fact that Congress granted this power to the courts does not neces-
sarily mean that our constitutional structure and separation-of-powers prin-
ciples allow it. Part IV addresses possible concerns with such a grant of
judicial review authority and argues that judicial review of DPAs does not
impermissibly undermine executive power and prosecutorial discretion. Sep-
aration-of-powers principles do not require courts to give prosecutors abso-
lute discretion in reaching DPAs with corporate defendants.
188. See infra Section IV.B.
189. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 166 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated
and remanded, No. 15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2016); see supra text accom-
panying notes 85, 101–104; see also Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *15.
190. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
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To evaluate whether judicial review violates separation-of-powers prin-
ciples, it is necessary to first assess the extent of executive power in criminal
prosecutions. Section IV.A discusses the broad power of prosecutors, as
members of the executive branch, to decide whether to bring charges against
possible criminal defendants. Section IV.B argues that the wide discretion
granted for charging decisions does not apply to decisions to “resolve” crim-
inal cases through DPAs. In the context of DPAs, the executive power is not
implicated in the way it would be were a court to second-guess a prosecu-
tor’s decision whether to bring charges; therefore, there is less concern that
judicial oversight of DPAs threatens the proper separation of powers.
A. Executive Authority by Other Means: Discretionary Power to Initiate or
Decline to Bring Charges
Courts have long recognized a broad executive power to decline to pros-
ecute.191 The decision whether to bring charges, often referred to as “the
charging decision,” is considered one of the “most important prosecutorial
power[s],”192 and prosecutors have “exclusive authority and absolute discre-
tion” in deciding whether to prosecute a case.193 This discretion arises from
the President’s constitutional power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,”194 a power imputed to federal prosecutors as delegates of the Pres-
ident.195 The DOJ has created charging guidelines, the U.S. Attorney’s Man-
ual (“USAM”), designed to limit this discretion.196 In deciding whether to
bring or decline to bring charges, the USAM directs federal prosecutors to
indict if they “believe[ ] that the person’s conduct constitutes a Federal of-
fense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain
and sustain a conviction.”197 A prosecutor may decline to charge, however,
based on his or her determination that no substantial federal interest is
served by prosecution, that the individual is subject to prosecution in an-
other jurisdiction, or that there exists an “adequate non-criminal alternative
to prosecution.”198 In assessing whether any of these factors apply, prosecu-
tors are directed to weigh “all relevant considerations.”199
191. E.g., ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (“[I]t is entirely
clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review.”).
192. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 393, 408 (2001).
193. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974), superseded by statute, Fed. R.
Evid. 104(a).
194. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3; Garrett, supra note 17, at 905.
195. Garrett, supra note 17, at 905, 905 n.204 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 464 (1996)).
196. Id. at 905 & n.206.
197. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.220 (2015). It is
important to note that the USAM is not law constraining prosecutorial discretion but rather
an exercise of that discretion by the Executive in instructing its own agents.
198. Id.
199. Id. §§ 9-27.230, 9-27.240, 9-27.250.
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The USAM guidelines demonstrate that there are various factors a pros-
ecutor must consider when deciding whether to indict. Although these
guidelines are internal instructions without the force of law, the Supreme
Court has consistently protected this broad, case-by-case conception of
prosecutorial discretion.200 Prosecutors, as part of a federal law enforcement
system, should be able to evaluate and analyze a variety of competing con-
cerns and interests as they make charging decisions: they are in the best
position to thoughtfully weigh those considerations and come to a well-rea-
soned decision.201
Courts, on the other hand, are ill-equipped to understand and evaluate
those considerations. As the Government argued in its appeal to the D.C.
Circuit in Fokker, “[t]he principle of prosecutorial discretion . . . reflects
certain well-recognized limitations on the judicial capacity to review charg-
ing decisions.”202 More specifically, analysis of the relevant factors, such as
“the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the
Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Gov-
ernment’s overall enforcement plan” is not the type of analysis courts are
competent to undertake.203 The D.C. Circuit, in its reversal of the Fokker
district court’s ruling, also recognized that “the Judiciary . . . generally is not
‘competent to undertake’ th[is] sort of inquiry.”204 Similarly, the district
court in Saena Tech, in declining to deny the DPA under its supervisory
power, noted that it was not the court’s role to “second-guess” prosecutorial
decisions.205
Judicial and legislative acceptance of prosecutorial discretion in charging
decisions, however, does not preclude judicial review of DPAs. The decision
to execute a DPA, as well as to choose its terms, goes far beyond the decision
of whether or not to bring charges. In the DPA context, charges have already
been brought, negating the concern that the judiciary is ill-equipped to de-
cide whether or not charges should be filed.206 And the terms of a DPA look
200. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[T]he decision whether
or not to prosecute . . . generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion.”); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974), superseded by statute, Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) (“[T]he Execu-
tive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
case . . . .”).
201. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (explaining the variety of
factors relevant to the charging decision, such as the Government’s enforcement priorities and
its overall enforcement plan).
202. Opening Brief for the United States, supra note 136, at 39.
203. Id. (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607).
204. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., No. 15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266, at *5 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 5, 2016).
205. United States v. Saena Tech. Corp., No. 1:14–CR–00066, 2015 WL 6406266, at *21
(D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015). More specifically, the district court explained that courts should not
second-guess charging decisions. Id. This Note contends, however, that DPAs and their con-
stituent terms are not charging decisions but rather resemble plea agreements.
206. As was the case in United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 163
(D.D.C. 2015), and United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, 2013 WL
3306161, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), charges are often filed at the same time as the DPA. The
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a lot more like punishment (i.e., sentencing) than a charge. In this way,
DPAs are more analogous to plea agreements than indictments. Like plea
agreements, DPAs include sanctioning or punishing language, which a
charging document would not contain. Therefore, because courts have the
authority to review plea agreements, they should likewise have the authority
to review DPAs.207
B. Prosecutorial Discretion Does Not Extend to DPAs
Although there might be reasons to think that this broad prosecutorial
discretion to decide whether or not to bring charges applies to the decision
whether or not to enter into a DPA, this argument is ultimately unpersua-
sive. In its appeal of the district court’s ruling in Fokker, the Government
argued that its broad discretion to decide whether and when to initiate crim-
inal cases extends, “by implication,” to whether and when to resolve criminal
cases.208 Thus, in the Government’s view, “[t]he district court’s invocation of
a ‘supervisory power’ to review the terms of a DPA for leniency . . . trans-
gresses the foundational principle of prosecutorial discretion.”209 At first
glance, this seems logical: if we readily accept that prosecutors need to be
insulated in their decisions to bring or decline charges, it might reasonably
follow that prosecutors should also have wide latitude in removing cases
from the criminal justice system, based on their evaluations of the circum-
stances at hand. But what the Government seeks is essentially a requirement
that district courts accept DPAs seemingly in all instances210—a proposition
that is more out of step with separation-of-powers principles than is some
amount of judicial review. And furthermore, we find judicial review of plea
agreements appropriate, and those agreements similarly resolve and remove
cases from the criminal justice system.211
Broad executive power to decline to prosecute is categorically different
from the decision to negotiate a DPA, where charges will be brought and
courts will be tasked with enforcing them. Prosecutors cannot have it both
ways. If they demand insulation from judicial review of the DPA itself, they
cannot also require courts to enforce the unreviewed agreement by hearing
D.C. Circuit’s reversal of the Fokker district court’s ruling relies significantly on its characteri-
zation of DPAs as “charging determinations.” Fokker, 2016 WL 1319266, at *5. This Note
disagrees with that characterization.
207. See infra Section IV.B.
208. Opening Brief for the United States, supra note 136, at 25.
209. Id. at 38.
210. It seems that the Government would allow a district court to reject a DPA if it was
clear that the Government was entering the agreement not for the purpose of achieving an
alternative resolution short of criminal conviction, but rather to avoid a “looming trial date.”
See id. at 56–57. This attempt to make sense of the statutory text providing for “court ap-
proval” fails. See id. at 55. If the Government enters into a DPA with a defendant corporation,
it is bound by that agreement: if the defendant complies with all of its terms, the charges must
be dismissed. Therefore, the Government could not put off a trial by entering into a DPA,
because DPAs can prevent the Government from going to trial at all.
211. See infra notes 214–219 and accompanying text.
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the case at trial, potentially long after the time frame contemplated by the
Speedy Trial Act. And, if a court does deny a proposed DPA, the Govern-
ment is not forced to pursue a criminal conviction—an outcome that might
raise a true separation-of-powers concern. Rather, the Government remains
free to try the case, negotiate a different DPA, or dismiss.212
Some might argue that to serve justice, courts should be able to review
specific terms within the agreements and suggest changes and alterations to
make the terms acceptable, rather than being constrained to accept or reject
the agreements in their entirety. Such review, however, may give rise to real
separation-of-powers concerns. By allowing a court to wade into each indi-
vidual term, such review places a far greater burden on prosecutors to en-
sure that every piece of an agreement—itself filled with a variety of
compromises between the Government and the defendant—is acceptable to
the court, rather than the agreement as a whole. Similar considerations in-
form the judicial review of plea agreements. More limited review, as sug-
gested by the district courts in HSBC Bank, Fokker, and Saena Tech, ensures
that defendants are treated fairly and that the public interest in just criminal
resolution is properly vindicated.213
In other situations where a prosecutor might pursue resolution of a
criminal indictment short of a conviction at trial, such as plea agreements
and dismissals of indictments, courts do have power to review and accept or
reject the Government’s proposals. Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,214 courts exercise review authority over plea agreements
and can adjust plea agreements they conclude are too harsh or too lenient.215
Although courts have historically limited their authority to their “traditional
participation in the sentencing process,”216 they have still exercised that re-
view authority in some capacity.217 In reviewing plea bargains, judges con-
sider the voluntariness of the plea, possible abuse of discretion on the part of
the prosecutor, the fairness of the agreement, the factual basis for the plea,
212. Opening Brief for the United States, supra note 136, at 65.
213. In United States v. Saena Tech Corp., No. 1:14–CR–00066, 2015 WL 6406266, at *16,
*21 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015), the court emphasized that its standard of review was limited to
determining whether the agreement was “truly about diversion” or whether it involved the
court in “unlawful or untoward collusion.” It stated however, that a court may review a DPA
for “fairness and adequacy” and determine whether its terms are mere “window-dressing.” Id.
Thus, an agreement without punitive measures or compliance requirements “could not be said
to be designed to secure a defendant’s reformation and should be rejected.” Id. at *16. Such
review is not plenary, but it seems to be more substantive than the court’s language suggests.
And although the lower court in Fokker and the Saena Tech Court engaged in somewhat differ-
ent analyses of their statutory and supervisory powers, it is hard to imagine a DPA that would
fail one court’s standard but not the other, in part because each looked at the substantive
terms of the agreements.
214. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
215. Opening Brief for United States, supra note 136, at 46; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979, 1994 (1992).
216. Opening Brief for United States, supra note 136, at 46.
217. See e.g., Garrett, supra note 17, at 906 (noting that federal courts “remain highly
deferential” when reviewing plea bargains). Daniel S. McConkie has argued that courts should
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and any concerns that the plea bargain infringes upon the judge’s sentencing
power.218 A judge may also reject a plea agreement when he or she “believes
that [the] bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.”219
Should a court reject a plea agreement, the Government is left with the same
options as it is when a court rejects a DPA. It can try the case, negotiate a
new plea agreement, or dismiss. In its reversal of the district court’s order in
Fokker, the D.C. Circuit stressed that under Rule 11, a court cannot reject a
proposed plea agreement because it disagrees with the “underlying charging
decisions.”220 But the fact that judicial review of plea agreements is not un-
fettered does not mean that no such review exists: courts can review plea
agreements and DPAs without passing judgment on the charging decisions
themselves. Rather, such review can address the implications of the agree-
ment, either through direct sentencing of the defendant (in the case of plea
agreements) or through the imposition of often significant penalties on the
defendant (in the case of DPAs).221
The similarities between plea agreements and DPAs help illustrate why
judicial review of DPAs comports with separation-of-powers principles. Plea
agreements serve the same purpose as DPAs: they allow prosecutors to “ob-
tain the optimum level of punishment at the least cost.”222 This practice
preserves resources, which can be used to pursue other prosecutions where
trials and criminal convictions are necessary for deterrence.223 Plea agree-
ments also illustrate the difference between judicial review of resolutions
that are short of criminal trials and conviction and judicial review of charg-
ing decisions themselves. Furthermore, plea agreements help demonstrate
why this distinction is significant in the DPA context. Assessing the adequacy
of punishment, in both plea agreements and DPAs, falls squarely within
what we consider the “traditional judicial function.”224 On the other hand,
deciding whether to bring charges involves the evaluation of a variety of
be more involved in the terms of plea agreements, asserting that judges are improperly ex-
cluded from the process until the very end. Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea
Bargaining, 26 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 61, 63–64 (2015). This allows prosecutors, motivated by
political considerations, to dictate the terms of plea agreements outside the public view. Id. at
64.
218. Garrett, supra note 17, at 906.
219. Id. at 907 (quoting United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985)).
220. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., No. 15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266, at *9 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 5, 2016).
221. The D.C. Circuit concluded that sentencing through plea agreements is fundamen-
tally and instructively different than the penalties and other conditions imposed through
DPAs. Id. at *10. This is incorrect, however, because both plea agreements and DPAs operate
to exact punishment on defendants.
222. Schulhofer, supra note 215, at 1980.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1997.
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considerations relating to law enforcement priorities and policies—an evalu-
ation properly conducted by prosecutors.225
Plea agreements also illustrate the proper balance between complete
prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage and the need for some type of
judicial review at the resolution stage. At the charging stage, when
prosecutorial discretion is at its zenith, informal pressures still operate on
the Government and affect the decision whether to indict.226 These informal
pressures include the opinions and desires of law enforcement, victims, and
the public at large.227 At the resolution stage, prosecutorial discretion is lim-
ited by judicial review, in part because it is much more difficult for these
informal pressures to serve as a check on prosecutorial conduct.228 A deci-
sion not to charge is much more visible and “much easier to question” than
a decision about what sentence to impose in return for a guilty plea.229 Simi-
larly, a decision not to prosecute is much more visible than a negotiated
DPA. When the Government reaches a plea agreement with a defendant, it is
more difficult for law enforcement, victims, and the public to evaluate the
complicated plea bargain.230 In the same way, when the Government enters
into a DPA with a corporate defendant, it is much harder for those actors to
assess whether or not justice has been served, because the agreements are
often long, complicated and filled with compromises.231
Furthermore, under Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Government may “with leave of court” dismiss an indictment.232 Again,
although courts have traditionally exercised their review authority in a lim-
ited manner, it is generally accepted that they have that review authority.233
In fact, as the Government admitted in its brief in Fokker, the “leave of
court” language has been interpreted to preserve and promote the proper
balance between the Executive and the Judiciary in criminal proceedings.234
The Judiciary ensures that the Executive “does not harass criminal defend-
ants through successive filings” but “defer[s] to the Executive’s determina-
tion that criminal charges should not be further pursued.”235 The D.C.
Circuit also recognized that the “leave of court” requirement is meant to
225. See supra notes 200–201 and accompanying text. Indeed, before the DOJ began pur-
suing DPAs, it sometimes sought guilty pleas coupled with compliance settlements. Garrett,
supra note 17, at 907.
226. See Schulhofer, supra note 215, at 1997.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1981–82.
231. See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1863, 1882–94
(2005), for a discussion of the complicated nature of DPAs.
232. Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a).
233. See, e.g., United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
234. Opening Brief for United States, supra note 136, at 45.
235. Id.
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“protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment.”236 It concluded that
this “narrow” review does not allow a court to deny a motion to dismiss
charges because the court disagrees with what the prosecutor charged or
failed to charge.237 Such a conclusion about Rule 48, however, does not con-
flict with the view that the Speedy Trial Act similarly provides for a narrow
type of judicial review. Judicial review under the Rule and the Act does not
impermissibly interfere with prosecutorial charging decisions; both protect
the defendant after such executive determinations have been made.
In other contexts, courts have long exercised authority to review resolu-
tions of criminal cases brought before them. Review of DPAs, while not
perfectly analogous to these other contexts, does not seem out of step. This
comparison significantly mitigates concerns about separations-of-powers
principles and Executive discretion.
V. A Standard of Review
Having examined the sources of judicial authority to review DPAs, ad-
dressed possible constitutional concerns relating to the separation of powers,
and concluded that courts possess the authority to review DPAs, this Note
now turns to the lingering question of the standard under which courts
should conduct that review. As noted previously, the text of the Speedy Trial
Act does not provide specific criteria in its “approval of the court” require-
ment. Part V argues that courts should review DPAs for substantive fairness
in the same limited manner that courts review plea agreements, relying on
their inherent supervisory power to do so.
As discussed in Part III, the inherent supervisory power of courts en-
ables them to impose rules and exact standards, so long as those judicial
actions are not in direct conflict with congressional actions or constitutional
mandates. In the DPA context, Congress has already provided the courts
with a statutory grant of power.238 To interpret that grant in a manner con-
sistent with congressional intent is entirely appropriate. Furthermore, there
is good reason to believe that in enacting the Speedy Trial Act, which plainly
had significant implications for the criminal justice system, Congress under-
stood that courts had supervisory power over the administration of criminal
justice, which they had exercised in a variety of other contexts to “fill in the
interstices” of congressional action.239 If Congress had intended to disrupt
236. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., No. 15–3016, 2016 WL 1319266, at *5 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 5, 2016) (quoting Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.5 (1977)).
237. Id. at *5–6. The D.C. Circuit has reached a similar conclusion regarding civil consent
decrees. The Tunney Act requires a court to “determine that the entry of [any consent] judg-
ment is in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (2012). The D.C. Circuit has reversed a
district court’s denial of a consent decree for failure to adequately serve the public interest,
concluding that the statute did not “authoriz[e] . . . a district judge to assume the role of
Attorney General.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995). It
did accept, however, that a district court could reject a decree that “appears to make a mockery
of judicial power.” Id.
238. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012).
239. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46–47 (1991).
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that power and prevent courts from intervening to ensure basic fairness, it
would have done so explicitly. Indeed, if Congress were to decide that a
broad standard of judicial review based on substantive fairness is inappro-
priate, it could take action to undo the courts’ interpretive work.
This proposal is also consistent with judicial review in other contexts
where courts are granted review authority but are given little guidance as to
the proper standard. For instance, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
authorizes courts to accept or reject plea agreements240 but provides no cri-
teria for doing so. A number of circuit courts, however, have interpreted
such language as providing district courts with broad discretion in rejecting
plea agreements.241 Similar to the judge’s role in accepting or rejecting plea
agreements, DPAs essentially require an evaluation of whether defendants
have been treated fairly and whether the public interest has been properly
vindicated by the agreements. Courts perform such evaluations incredibly
frequently when they assess plea agreements—there is no reason to conclude
that they are not authorized to do so in the DPA context as well.
Conclusion
The dramatic increase in the DOJ’s use of DPAs in corporate cases raises
a number of questions about the proper balance between executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial authority. This Note has argued that district courts are
empowered to substantively review DPAs for fairness, drawing upon the
statutory grant of that authority in the Speedy Trial Act and the supervisory
power of courts. Such authority does not run afoul of separation-of-powers
principles. The Speedy Trial Act provides a congressional grant of review
authority to the courts. Although the Act does not itself provide a clear
substantive standard, the statutory grant allows courts to invoke the supervi-
sory power to review DPAs for substantive fairness, absent additional con-
gressional guidance.
240. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4)–(5).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 679 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a
court can reject a plea agreement it “believes is too lenient or otherwise not in the public
interest”); United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United States
v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 1990), and then quoting United States v. Ammidown,
497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (concluding that a district court has broad discretion to
reject a plea agreement so long as it provides “reasoned exercise of discretion” and is not
“arbitrary”).
